A maliciously modified copy of Anthropic's Claude Code extension sat in Cursor's extension marketplace for about 11 hours on October 29, according to Cursor. The company says the package, version 2.1.313, was available from roughly 2:27 a.m. to 1:35 p.m. Pacific Time and ran code that tried to install a persistent SSH backdoor. Cursor says at most 5,000 users were affected.
Anthropic did not build the package. Anthropic says the incident only affects Cursor users and is not a compromise of its own systems, and Microsoft's analysis notes that 2.1.313 was never published to Open VSX or the Microsoft marketplace. How the attacker got into Cursor's marketplace has not been publicly explained, BleepingComputer reports.
Cursor says the code collected the hostname, username, operating system, home directory, environment variable names, the Git email and the public IP address. It then tried to add an attacker key labeled svc-telemetry to authorized_keys, enable SSH and open a reverse tunnel, and it installed persistence through a macOS LaunchAgent or a Windows scheduled task that retried about every 60 seconds. Because of coding errors, the tunnel step would fail outside unusual conditions, Cursor says, but the key, persistence and data beacon still ran. Researchers at Phorion described the same mistakes.
Cursor removed the version, shut down and rebuilt the marketplace, rotated keys, and worked with the host to take the attacker's server offline. It found no evidence other extensions were tampered with. Its advice: if you installed or updated the extension during the window, check authorized_keys for the svc-telemetry key, run Cursor's macOS or Windows remediation script, rotate credentials reachable from the machine, and consider rebuilding the host. Uninstalling alone is not enough because standalone persistence scripts keep running.
For developers this is a reminder that editor extensions run with your permissions, and an official-looking name from a marketplace is not proof of safety. AI coding tools make the point sharper, since they are built to read files and run commands. Pin or review extension updates where you can, and keep secrets out of environment variables on dev machines.
Open questions remain, including how the publish happened and who is behind it. Cursor's security notice and Microsoft's write-up list the file hashes and network indicators for anyone hunting across a fleet.
Sources
- Ars TechnicaAnthropic VS code extension on Cursor backdoored for nearly 12 hours
- Fast CompanyHackers hijacked a Claude Code extension, exposing yet another new AI security risk
- Unite.AICursor Discloses SSH Backdoor Attempt in Malicious Claude Code Extension
- WIREDA Supply Chain Attack Put Malicious Anthropic Claude Extensions on Thousands of Devices
- MicrosoftInside a malicious Claude Code-branded extension and its persistent SSH backdoor
- ReutersCursor says up to 5,000 users affected by tampered Claude Code extension
- OX SecurityCompromised Claude Code Extension (2.1.313) in Cursor Marketplace Plants Attacker SSH Key and Persistence
- SophosMalicious Claude Code extension distributed through Cursor marketplace
- Step SecurityTrojanized Claude Code Extension Delivered Persistent SSH Backdoor to Developer Machines
- MorphisecTrusted Tool, Malicious Build: What the Trojanized Claude Code Extension Means for Developer Endpoints
- BleepingComputerMalicious Claude Code extension on Cursor planted SSH backdoors
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From the issue
OpenAI, Google and Anthropic back one AI opt-out Saturday, October 31, 2026